As Creativity and Innovation in Animals is the title of this book, these two terms are the key along with play. Interestingly, these are also the terms used by Bateson and Martin in their book title. But what is meant by each term? While detailed elsewhere in this volume, the common usage of the terms by Bateson and Martin is straightforward. Creativity is having a new idea; innovation is applying that idea in a productive and novel manner so that a better outcome is developed. This is close to the distinction between the roles of basic research or brainstorming and applied science or engineering. I view this distinction, though clear enough at the ends of the continuum and applicable in many aspects of human culture, not so useful in the nonhuman animal literature, child development literature, and some other areas where creativity is discussed and thus I downplay, even conflate, the distinction in this chapter. Although the following may seem to be tangentially related to the topic, I think that these points are deeply relevant in considering play in the creative process.
First of all, having an original idea is not that obvious when observing animals as compared to hearing or reading a verbal exemplar of a purported new idea by a person. In art, perhaps, it can be claimed that a new painting style, use of a new medium, applying different tools [spray paint rather than a brush] could be counted as creative, as well as a new useful construction. Musical composition is similar; indeed novel sounds and combinations are much discussed in the avian literature as well in humpback whale songs [Payne & McVay, 1971]. Such behavioral products can be discerned in non-literate animals and an underlying creative process inferred. But what if such productions are not really new? Was Roger Bacon creative when he discovered gunpowder or Guttenberg the printing press, as actually both were already known in Asia? Or is something creative only if it is new or novel in the culture or population of a specific group? But then, even if gunpowder or the printing press were new in that culture, did the creators “just” apply or extend in an incremental way knowledge or skills already present, which only in retrospect, led to truly momentous change? This is not, we shall see, a trivial issue in creativity research.
Second, consider science itself. When is a new finding creative? We often put little stock in replication as compared to a new result. But what about applying a finding or method to a new species—demonstrating that not only rhesus monkeys develop learning sets but also Japanese macaques? A replication with a similar species doesn’t seem very creative. But what about showing the process occurs in a bird, for which rather different methods needed to be developed than those used by Harlow [1949] to demonstrate the effect? Was this more creative? Perhaps the true creativity was only to be seen in the initial Harlow studies. But then, learning sets were an extension of habit reversal studies that similarly looked at a type of “learning to learn.” This all seems a bit beside the point. Still, we do not consider all scientists equally creative. But are not all scientists, qua scientists [e.g., not technicians] necessarily creative, more or less, whenever they discover something new in nature. Are only the recognized stars, the Nobel Laureates, the creative elite truly creative? On the other hand, perhaps true creativity resides only in scientists who fostered the paradigm shifts that so intrigued Kuhn [1996]. The names of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Faraday, Einstein, Watson and Crick come to mind. But then these also were often dependent on predecessors as in Newton’s famous, and now trite, line that he saw further since he stood on the shoulders of giants. You can see why discussions of the distinction between what is creative, novel, and innovative begin to lose traction and what and who is creative seems to fade before our tired eyes. But does any of this relate to animals?
Third, the appellation “creative” is one that we do not typically apply to behavioral development, where animals often go through stages of personal discovery, as growth and maturation allow new behavioral and cognitive milestones to be traversed. Thus, every child develops “ideas” and new behavioral abilities that are, for them, truly innovative when they begin to grasp objects, speak, construct sentences, crawl, walk, run, open doors, feed themselves, etc. And it is not only these behaviors. Consider the statement of one of the earliest scientists of child development [Preyer, 1893] that also introduces play:
A satisfactory theory of play is still wanting, and yet a man does not learn through any kind of instruction or study in later life anything like so much as the child learns in the first four years of his careless existence, through the perceptions and ideas acquired in his play… as I have previously spoken of the experimenting of little children as play, I may now mention the internal resemblance of their procedure to that of the naturalist [Preyer, 1893]
Here, the distinction between child and scientist collapses and play, curiosity, and exploration enter the room. But do not many scientists and artists often view their accomplishments as based on the play of youth extending into adulthood and even old age! This quotation from Preyer allows us to see how play may be at the heart of creativity and innovation, however defined, and it is this claim that will animate this chapter. It has, in various disguises, been at the heart of much discussion of childhood education and play. In any event, certainly nonhuman animals go through developmental milestones just as do children [Parker & McKinney, 1999].
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Postpartum Depression, Effects on Infant
D.M. Teti, N. Towe-Goodman, in Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development, 2008
Postpartum depression in mothers is common and can have insidious effects on mothers and their children, particularly if the depression persists beyond the early postpartum period. Infants of depressed mothers are at significantly elevated risk for irritability and withdrawal, insecure attachment, attentional deficits, and developmental delay in the achievement of basic cognitive milestones such as object permanence.? Rates of psychiatric disturbance among older children of depressed mothers are as much as four to five times those among children of nondepressed mothers, and children whose mothers are depressed are also at risk for poor academic performance, difficulties in interpersonal relationships, substance abuse, and delinquency. Depression can seriously compromise parenting quality. Depressed mothers are likely to hold negative, unfavorably views of their children and of themselves as parents, and mothers’ negative affective biases may promote tendencies to attribute negative intentions and motives to their children’s behavior. In turn, depressed parenting is less warm, attuned, and responsive than nondepressed parenting. Individual differences in depressed parenting are evident, however, and appear to be associated with differences in child temperament and, more broadly, with the quality of ‘fit’ between a mother’s condition, child characteristics, and the family environment. Fortunately, depression is a highly treatable condition, and depressed mothers can make use of both pharmacological and support-based ‘talking’ therapies.? Pediatricians, who may be among the first health professionals to identify postpartum depression, can play an important role in referring affected mothers to appropriate mental health facilities.
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Cultural Snapshots: A Method to Capture Social Contexts in Development of Prejudice and Stereotyping
Kristin Pauker, ... Max Weisbuch, in Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 2019
1 Introduction
Social and developmental psychologists have worked for decades to better understand the causes and consequences of prejudice and stereotyping in childhood [see Levy & Killen, 2008]. We present a critical review of research on the role of the social environment in children's acquisition of prejudice and stereotyping, and we identify fundamental, unanswered questions in the field. We then introduce a new methodological approach that can be used to answer these questions. The majority of empirical studies have focused on within-child factors [e.g., age, racial identification, cognitive milestones] rather than the social environment to explain the acquisition of biases. Alternatively, some studies have focused on broad macro factors [e.g., school demographics or neighborhood diversity] that typically can only be examined with a correlational design. Accordingly, many fundamental questions remain unanswered with respect to how the social environment causes children to acquire prejudice and stereotypes; these questions can be addressed with the methodology we present.
Reflective of extant research on the development of intergroup biases, we focus on the development of racial prejudice and racial stereotyping. In this context, racial prejudice is a negative evaluation of people based on their race whereas racial stereotypes are beliefs [or cognitive representations] about the characteristics of people based on their race. Given the societal consequences of racial prejudice and stereotyping, it is critical for scientists to identify the specific features of the social environments that communicate and maintain such racial biases. Equally important is understanding how those features influence the development of prejudice and stereotypes. More specifically, social scientists have yet to identify the specific aspects of children's environments that [a] communicate that race is an important category to attend to, [b] communicate the cultural status of different groups, and [c] cause children to develop attitudes and beliefs about those groups.
To address these unanswered questions we describe a method called cultural snapshots. This method requires scientists [1] to code a large representative sample of recordings of social environments and [2] carefully apply experimental methods to examine how those social environments shape children's prejudice and stereotypes. Cultural snapshots can be used to examine how specific features of the social environment cause children to acquire or resist prejudice and stereotypes and enable scientists to examine if and how children are socialized to develop biases toward any social group [e.g., gender, age, sexual orientation]. We focus on how cultural snapshots can be used to understand racial prejudice and stereotyping in childhood.
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Early Development in Fragile X Syndrome: Implications for Developmental Screening
Donald B. Bailey, ... Anne C. Wheeler, in International Review of Research in Developmental Disabilities, 2011
2.1 Cognitive
Global cognitive impairment is evident in almost all males with full mutation FXS and is present in approximately 25% of girls with fm FXS [Cornish, Turk, & Hagerman, 2008]. By the time most children with FXS are identified, around 3 years of age, cognitive delays are usually clear [Skinner et al., 2005], with the rate of development being documented at about half the rate of typical peers for boys [Bailey, Hatton, & Skinner, 1998] and roughly 65% the rate of typical peers for girls [Hatton et al., 2009]. However, very few studies have documented the cognitive development of infants with FXS as young as 9 months of age and no reported studies have examined development in children younger than 8 months of age. For the purposes of earlier identification there is a need to identify at what point in early development these delays are first apparent.
The research that has documented early development in infants and toddlers with FXS, despite reported based on relatively small numbers, provides some insight with regards to early development in these children. Baranek et al. [2008] found that, on average, 9 month olds assessed on the Early Learning Composite [ELC] of the Mullen Scales of Early Learning [MSEL] received scores 1.4 standard deviations below published norms. Further, Mirrett et al. [2004], using the Battelle Developmental Inventory Screening Test [BDIST], found a clear delay in overall development in 4 out of 11 boys and 2 out of 4 girls with FXS at 9 months of age. Suspected delays were noted in an additional 2 boys and 1 girl. More recently Roberts et al. [2009] found 55% of boys with FXS demonstrated a 25% global delay as young as 9 months of age on the MSEL, with mean age equivalents for this sample being nearly 2 months behind expected levels. However, on the subtest of the MSEL most closely associated with cognitive development [Visual Reception], only 27% of boys demonstrated a delay at 9 months.
Cognitive subscales within early developmental measures generally progress from items tapping sensory awareness in the early months through more complex understanding of concepts and memory skills by later in the early childhood years. Most items on developmental measures and screeners expected to be successfully completed by 9 month olds involve visual and sensory exploration of the environment and demonstration of emerging object permanence and simple imitation. Cognitive milestones usually met by 12 months of age continue to be sensory, motoric, and socially derived. They include exploring items in multiple ways [shaking, banging, dropping], imitating actions, finding hidden objects easily, and beginning to use items correctly [drinking from a cup, brushing hair, etc.].
For children with FXS at 12 months of age, scores on the ELC of the MSEL have been reported to be similar to those at 9 months of age, with the average score being approximately 1.7 standard deviations below the mean for typically developing children [Baranek et al., 2008]. Similarly, Roberts et al. [2009] found that the numbers of children who met for a 25% global delay on the MSEL remained around 50% at 12 months [with a mean age equivalent roughly 3 months behind typical development]. However, at 12 months 53% met for a 25% delay on the Visual Reception subscale of the MSEL, suggesting somewhat greater sensitivity of the MSEL to identify delays in children with FXS at 12 months than at 9 months. In addition, in the Mirrett et al. [2004] study, by 12 months 10 out of 13 boys [77%], and 1 out of 3 girls [33%] were identified as having developmental delays on the BDIST.
As infants grow into toddlers, developmental expectations become somewhat clearer. By 18 months, skills measured on cognitive domains of developmental measures are more concrete. Eighteen month cognitive milestones include being able to demonstrate simple matching, understanding the use of different objects, being able to identify items in books or body parts on self, engaging in problem solving through trial and error, and following simple one step directions.
By 18 months subtle delays detected at 9 or 12 months are generally more evident, and children with FXS often demonstrate a greater discrepancy in scores on developmental measures from their typically developing peers. By 18 months of age 83% of the Roberts et al. sample was found to have a 25% global delay [with mean age equivalents now 7 months behind expected levels] and 72% demonstrated a 25% delay in Visual Reception. Average overall scores on the MSEL at 18 months were reported to be 2.5 standard deviations below the mean in the Baranek et al. [2008] study. Further, while not as clear as data on boys, girls with FXS also demonstrate more striking delays by 18 months, with age equivalents being 2–4 months behind their typical peers [Hatton et al., 2009].
By 30 months of age, global cognitive delays are usually evident in children with FXS. In fact, in all studies examining early development in FXS, the majority of children assessed were identified as having substantial delays by 24 months of age [Baranek et al., 2008; Hatton et al., 2009; Mirrett et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009].
Based on the limited research that has been conducted with infants with FXS, it appears that approximately half of boys demonstrate clear cognitive delays as young as 9 months, whereas by 18 months delays for both boys and girls are more clearly evident, and by 24 months, most children with FXS demonstrate significantly delayed cognitive skills than their peers. The presence of comorbid autism may at least partially explain why some infants show delays more clearly earlier. However, it is important to note that the assessment of cognitive development, especially in the youngest children, is heavily reliant on the child's motor, sensory, and language abilities. Therefore, these other domains of development may be more sensitive in identifying delays in very young children with FXS.
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Early development
Paula Thomson, S. Victoria Jaque, in Creativity and the Performing Artist, 2017
Erik Erikson’s psychosocial model of development
To organize this massive topic, Erik Erikson’s psychosocial developmental model will provide a theoretical framework to illuminate unique features in each stage of early development. Embedded within these developmental stages is the cognitive development outlined by Piaget [Newman & Newman, 2015]. Piaget’s theory is closely aligned with Erikson’s stages of development [see Box 9.2]. The motor, language/communication, and cognitive milestones are also integrated into Erikson’s staged model [see Boxes 9.1, 9.3, 9.4]. For the purpose of this chapter, only the early developmental stages will be outlined; the later adult stages will be addressed in the discussion on careers.
Box 9.1 Cognitive Milestones [Piaget, 1951]
Infancy: 1–2 yearsSensorimotor learning modality, exploring world through tastes and touch, sensorimotor representational schemes formed, object permanencyToddlerhood: 2–4 yearsPiaget’s preoperational thought [internalize sensorimotor schemes into semiotic thinking/symbols], able to talk about feelings and express thoughts and ideas to others [including some ability to speak about intense angry feelings], awareness of distress in others, aware they have self-agency and desire to direct others’ behaviors, able to use language in goal-directed desiresEarly childhood: 4–6 yearsUnderstand gender, gender constancy, and gender schemes; early moral development emerges [judgments based on reward and punishment, consequences affecting being loved, approval or disapproval from authority]; empathy awareness increasing, friendship groups formedMiddle childhood: 6–12 yearsPerspective taking and cognitive flexibility growing; aware of social norms and peer pressure; awareness of friendships, loneliness, and rejection; Piaget’s stage of concrete operational thought; aware of physical matter as stable and no longer magically changing; aware actions can be reversed; increased awareness of categorization and computational skills; metacognition emerges [thinking about thinking]; domain-specific skill strengths and weaknesses clearly manifested; reading literacy and fluency rapidly developing; social and cultural contexts assimilated through reading; aware of social and parental pressuresEarly adolescence: 13–18 yearsPiaget’s formal operational thought; approach problem solving with probabilistic thinking; able to mentally manipulate more than two categories simultaneously; draw upon many variables to explain behavior; think about things changing in the future and aware that things will not remain the same; predict logical outcomes based on behavioral actions and choices; detect logical inconsistencies and distressed by statements that contradict reality; can think in relativistic terms about self, other individuals, and the world; fully aware of cultural norms and differences [including group norms, boundaries, and identities]
Box 9.2 Erikson’s Psychosocial Developmental Stages [Erikson, 1959/1980]
Infancy: 0–24 monthsTrust versus mistrustToddlerhood: 2–4 yearsAutonomy versus shame and doubtEarly school age: 4–6 yearsInitiative versus guiltMiddle childhood: 6–12 yearsIndustry versus inferiorityEarly adolescence: 12–18 yearsGroup identity versus alienationLate adolescence: 18–24 yearsIndividual identity versus identity confusionEarly adulthood: 24–34 yearsIntimacy versus isolationMiddle adulthood: 34–60 yearsGenerativity versus stagnationLate adulthood: 60+ yearsIntegrity versus despair
Box 9.3 Motor Milestones [Newman & Newman, 2015]
Infancy: 0–24 monthsRaises head, brings hands to mouth, grasps and shakes toys, rolls both ways, sits with and without support, supports weight on legs, reaches with one hand, transfers objects from hand to hand, gets to sitting position without help, crawls forward on belly, assumes hand-and-knee position, gets from sitting to crawling position, pulls up to stand, walks holding furniture, walks alone, pulls toys behind while walking forward, carries large toys or several toys, begins to run, stands on tiptoe, kicks a ball, climbs onto furniture, walks up and down stairsToddlerhood: 2–4 years[2–3 years] Walks rhythmically with opposite arm and leg swing, jumps down from a step, jumps into the air, hops 1–3 times on same foot, throws ball with forearm extension only [feet remain stationary], catches with rigid arms, pushes a riding toy with feet, walks up stairs[3–4 years] Walks upstairs alternating feet, walks downstairs leading with one foot, jumps with coordinated arm action, broad jumps about 1 foot, hops 4–6 times on same foot while coordinating upper body and nonhopping leg, throws ball with slight body rotation but little or no torso rotation or transfer of weight, flexes elbows in anticipation to catch a ball, but catches by trapping ball against chest, steers and pedals tricycleEarly school years: 4–6 years[4–5 years] Walks downstairs alternating feet, runs more smoothly, gallops and skips with one foot, improved upward and forward jumps and covering greater distance, throws ball with increased body rotation and some transfer of weight forward, catches ball with hand [sometimes trapping ball against chest], rides tricycle rapidly, steers smoothly[5–6 years] Increased speed of run; gallops easily and skips; increasing jumping and broad jumping; hops rhythmically, changing feet and rhythm patterns; mature throwing and catching pattern; adjusts body to accommodate pathway and size of ball, rides bicycle with training wheelsMiddle childhood: 6–12 yearsDomain-specific skills clearly identified and valued by child [prior to this stage, talented children present precocious abilities]
Box 9.4 Language and Communication Milestones [Newman & Newman, 2015]
Infancy: 0–24 monthsSmiles as greeting; startles when hearing loud sound; makes cooing sounds; quiet attentive listening; recognize voices and faces; cries differently to signal needs; makes gurgling sounds; babbles repetitive syllables; uses voice to express pleasure and pain; eye tracking to follow sounds and objects; responds to tone of voice; pays attention to music and toy sounds; tries to imitate words; says a few words; understands words and increasingly able to speak them [50–180 words]; understands “no”; turns and looks in the direction of sounds; points to objects and pictures and tries to name them; recognizes people, objects, and body parts; follows simple directions and gesturesToddlerhood: 2–4 years[2–3 years] Speaks between 50 and 300 words, enjoys listening to stories, uses some adjectives to describe environment and able to name everything in the environment, uses 2–3 word sentences, comprehension by others unfamiliar with child still problematic[3–4 years] Vocabulary of 500–1000+ words; speaks in 3–4 word sentences, and by 4 years able to speak in full sentences; answers simple questions and others can understand the child; bilingual acquisition limits number of words within each language; comprehension for multiple languages slower but this evens out in early childhoodEarly childhood: 4–6 yearsLanguage acquisition continues to expand, early stages of reading and mathematical comprehensionMiddle childhood: 6–12 yearsRapid growth in reading and mathematical skillsEarly adolescence: 13–18 yearsComplex abstract concepts expressed in language and mathematics
Erik Erikson proposed a psychosocial theory to explain the trajectory of human growth. This theory was based on an interaction between the psychological maturation of the individual and the societal context they are raised within [Newman & Newman, 2015]. According to Erikson [1959/1980], each developmental stage is marked by psychosocial crises that necessitate some form of resolution; the individual is then propelled into the next phase of development. Erikson outlined eight major stages of development throughout the lifespan; however, he also claimed that if a particular stage was poorly navigated, the individual could address these deficits and complete the developmental tasks of that stage later in life. For example, if an infant is raised in an environment that is inconsistent and unreliable, an abiding belief forms that the world and the caregivers in the world are untrustworthy. This belief also influences a sense of self. All become untrustworthy. This first developmental stage, according to Erikson’s theory, can be repaired in later stages of development. In this example, the infant who completed the first stage of development with a solidified mistrust in self, other, and world, can, as a young child, adolescent, or adult, experience relationships, education, or career stability that cultivates growing trust in the world and the self. Erikson’s theory offers developmental landmarks and yet there are always possibilities to change; he viewed humanity as fundamentally resilient and able to adapt to the world and circumstances surrounding them [Erikson, 1959/1980; Newman & Newman, 2015].
According to Erikson, the first stage of development, trust versus mistrust, describes the infant and young toddlers’ task as one of forming a sense of trust about the burgeoning self and the world surrounding the self. In the second stage, autonomy versus shame and doubt, the toddler acquires a sense of independence, while in the third stage, initiative versus inferiority, the child between 4 and 6 years of age learns to interact in school and group environments, promoting a greater sense of purpose and self-identification. In middle childhood, the fourth developmental stage, industry versus inferiority, education and competencies are highlighted. The fifth stage of development, group identity versus alienation, defines the psychosocial tasks of early adolescence, one that addresses the need to solidify and stabilize peer interactions and form a sense of group identity. The sixth stage of development, individual identity versus identity confusion, takes place during late adolescence and early adulthood, a time when a sense of self is clearly defined and guides all future plans and decisions. If these stages are unsuccessfully traversed then the negative developmental task is confirmed. For example, toddlers who are unable to establish a sense of autonomy are left feeling doubt; a growing self-conscious awareness that others may reject the very essence of their being fills them with intense internalized shame [Budden, 2009; Newman & Newman, 2015; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012].
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Development of structure and function in the infant brain: Implications for cognition, language and social behaviour
Sarah J. Paterson, ... April A. Benasich, in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 2006
The attainment of object permanence is an important cognitive milestone. However, the early executive control mechanisms underlying it, such as response inhibition and attentional control, are more relevant to later development. Future research should investigate how the frontal lobes interact with other brain areas to allow control of complex behaviour. The work on object permanence and rapid auditory processing also illustrates the important contribution of animal studies to making links between brain and behaviour. Animal studies enable us to perturb the cognitive system in controlled ways that are not possible within studies of human development [Fitch et al., 2001]. Such studies highlight how quite small and seemingly delimited changes in brain structure and function can have large effects on the behavioural outcome. The object permanence data from imaging, animals and human infants, showing the importance of the prefrontal cortex for this task, are an excellent example of how converging methodologies can enable us to verify the presence of links between brain and behaviour.
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PSYCHOSIS
Til Wykes, Mark van der Gaag, in Clinical Psychology Review, 2001
CET’s goals are to facilitate the attainment of social cognitive milestones by providing meaningful and self-directed experiences rather than responses based on role modelling in contrived situations. The programme uses computerised training of memory and attention based on software devised for the rehabilitation of people with closed head injuries. However, in each programme session one patient is paired with another whose cognitive problems are different than his or her own. The pair collaborate on the software exercises and maintain records of performance. After three months patients enter larger groups of 6 to 8 people who socialise and work together on the programmes. In total, the patients take part in 6 months of nonsocial cognition training before they begin the social cognition training. This consists of group exercises that focus on “gistful” interpretations of information such as summing up an article in a newspaper to another person. The patient collaborator or the therapist will try to encourage the speaker to be as clear as possible in their communications. Non-participant members of the group remain silent during an exercise but they are expected to take notes and give feedback. Each of the group sessions for social cognition is completed with 15 minutes of psychoeducation.
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Special issue: Developmental cognitive neuroscience
B.J. Casey, ... Sarah Durston, in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
The most compelling reports of structural changes with development over the period of childhood and adolescence have come from recent longitudinal MRI studies [6,7]. In general, the sequence in which the cortex matures parallels cognitive milestones in human development [6–9]. First, regions subserving primary functions, such as motor and sensory systems, mature earliest, with temporal and parietal association cortices associated with basic language skills and spatial attention maturing next. Higher-order association areas, such as the prefrontal and lateral temporal cortices, which integrate primary sensorimotor processes and modulate basic attention and language processes, seem to mature last [6,7]. Specifically, MRI-based measures showed that cortical gray matter loss occurred earliest in the primary sensorimotor areas and latest in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [6,10]. These findings are consistent with non-human and human primate postmortem studies showing that the prefrontal cortex matures at a more protracted rate than sensorimotor cortex in synaptic density [11,12]. Cross-sectional studies of normative brain maturation during childhood and adolescence have shown somewhat similar patterns concluding that gray matter loss during this period reflects a sculpting process of the immature brain into the fully functioning mature one [10,13–16]. As such, the pattern of development observed is suggested to reflect the ongoing neuronal regressive events, such as pruning and the elimination of connections.
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