Abstract
When Are A Tariff and A Quota Equivalent? This paper extends the work of Bhagwati and others on the ``nonequivalence'' of tariffs and quotas by taking the motive for protection into account. Specifically, the welfare cost associated with tariff or quota protection of a monopolized domestic industry is shown to depend on the objective underlying protection. Where the objective of protection is to raise domestic price, an import quota results in a lower welfare cost than a tariff which achieves the same objective. A quota may also provide a less costly means of fixing domestic monopoly profits at a predetermined level than a comparable tariff. /// Quand un droit de douane et un contingentement sont-ils équivalents? Cet article prolonge les travaux de Bhagwati et d'autres sur l'absence d'équivalence entre les droits et les contingentements, en tenant compte des raisons de la protection douanière. Même s'il n'y a pas d'équivalence « naturelle » entre les droits et les contingentements quand la production domestique est monopolisée, on peut redéfinir l'équivalence en terme de l'objectif particulier qui sous-tend la protection. L'étape suivante consiste à comparer les coûts en bien-être de la poursuite de cet objectif par différents moyens. Quand la protection a pour objectif d'augmenter le prix domestique, un contingentement à l'importation conduit à un coût en bien-être plus faible qu'un droit de douane qui permettrait d'atteindre le même résultat. Un contingentement représente probablement aussi un moyen moins coûteux de fixation des profits de monopoles domestiques à des niveaux prédéterminés, par comparison avec un droit comparable. Ces résultats présentent un intérêt certain dans la mesure où l'on suppose souvent que les contingentements sont particulièrement contre-indiqués quand la production domestiques est monopolisée. Par contraste, lorsque l'objectif visé est l'accroissement de la production domestique ou la réduction des importations, un droit permet d'atteindre les résultats visés à un coût en bien-être inférieur.
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The Canadian Journal of Economics [CJE] is the journal of the Canadian Economics Association [CEA] and is published by Blackwell. The CJE has its roots in the journal Contributions to Canadian Economics, which began publication in the 1928 and was replaced in 1935 by the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science [CJEPS]. In 1968, CJEPS divided into two parts: The Canadian Journal of Economics and the Canadian Journal of Political Science. The CJE and its forerunners have a long tradition as a leading general interest journal in economics and have published many classic papers in economics including, for example, Paul Samuelson's classic 1939 paper on the gains from trade and early work by Robert Mundell related to optimum currency areas. The CJE seeks to maintain and enhance its position as the leading economics journal based in Canada and as a major internationally recognized journal. It is receptive to high quality papers in any field of economics and from any source. In addition its editors recognize a particular responsibility regarding high quality empirical papers related to the Canadian economy. JSTOR provides a digital archive of the print version of The Canadian Journal of Economics. The electronic version of The Canadian Journal of Economics is available at //www.interscience.wiley.com. Authorized users may be able to access the full text articles at this site.
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The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique © 1973 Canadian Economics Association
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