What does the Constitution say about which law shall predominate if they are in any conflict between laws?
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Signed in but can't access contentOxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian. Institutional account managementFor librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more. Abstract Legitimacy is a term much invoked but little analyzed in constitutional debates. Uncertainty and confusion frequently result. This Article fills a gap in the literature by analyzing the idea of constitutional legitimacy. It argues that the term invites appeal to three distinct kinds of criteria that in turn support three distinct but partly overlapping concepts of legitimacy - legal, sociological, and moral. When we examine legitimacy debates with these three concepts in mind, striking conclusions emerge. First, the legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends more on its present sociological acceptance than on the (questionable) legality of its formal ratification. Second, although the Constitution deserves to be recognized as morally legitimate, it is only "minimally" rather than "ideally" so: it is not morally perfect, nor has it ever enjoyed unanimous consent. Third, because the Constitution invites disagreement about what it means and how it should be interpreted, many claims about the legal legitimacy of practices under the Constitution rest on inherently uncertain foundations. Significantly, however, a virtual consensus exists that at least some judicial precedents suffice to support future claims of legitimate judicial authority, even when those precedents were themselves erroneously decided in the first instance. Like the legal legitimacy of the Constitution, the legal legitimacy of precedent-based decisionmaking arises from sociological acceptance. Fourth, in the absence of greater legal and sociological consensus, judgments about many purportedly legal questions, including questions of judicial legitimacy, frequently reflect assumptions about the moral legitimacy of official action. Realistic discourse about constitutional legitimacy must therefore reckon with the snarled interconnections among constitutional law, its sociological foundations, and the felt imperatives of practical exigency and moral right. Journal Information The Harvard Law Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts. Each issue also contains pieces by student editors. Published monthly from November through June, the Review has roughly 2,000 pages per volume. All articles--even those by the most respected authorities--are subjected to a rigorous editorial process designed to sharpen and strengthen substance and tone. The November issue contains the Supreme Court Foreword (usually by a prominent constitutional scholar), the faculty Case Comment, twenty-five Case Notes (analyses by third-year students of the most important decisions of the previous Supreme Court Term), and a compilation of Court statistics. The February issue features the annual Developments in the Law project, an in-depth treatment of an important area of the law. Publisher Information Founded in 1887 by future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Harvard Law Review is an entirely student-edited journal that is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Approximately ninety student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions and, together with a professional business staff of four, carry out day-to-day operations. Aside from serving as an important academic forum for legal scholarship, the Review is designed to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. The Review also provides opportunities for its members to develop their own editing and writing skills. All student writing is unsigned, reflecting the fact that many members of the Review, in addition to the author and supervising editor, make a contribution to each published piece. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. What does the Constitution say about which law shall predominate if there are any conflict between laws?Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution is commonly referred to as the Supremacy Clause. It establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions.
What happens when a state's Constitution is in conflict with the US Constitution?When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
What does Article 1 Section 3 of the Constitution say?The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
What does Article 1 Section 10 of the Constitution say?No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
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