Congress’ ability to override a presidential veto is an example of which principle?

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution creates certain rules to govern how Congress makes law. Its first Clause—known as the Origination Clause—requires all bills for raising revenue to originate in the House of Representatives. The second—the Presentment Clause—requires all laws to be presented to the President for his signature or veto. And the third Clause—the Presentment of Resolutions Clause—prevents Congress from sidestepping the Presentment Clause. Taken together, these rules channel lawmaking through a process that promotes thorough deliberation over the wisdom of any new legislation.

The Origination Clause derived from an English parliamentary practice requiring all money bills to have their first reading in the House of Commons. The Framers borrowed this practice, hoping that it would confer the “power of the purse” on the legislative body most responsive to the people—the House of Representatives. As such, only the House may introduce bills “for raising revenue,” although the Senate is explicitly empowered to amend House-originated bills. Any other type of bill may originate in either the Senate or the House.

The Origination Clause was part of the Great Compromise. A concession to the larger states, which were dissatisfied with the smaller states’ disproportionate power in the Senate, it limits the power to introduce tax and tariff bills exclusively to the House of Representatives, where the larger states enjoyed greater representation. But while the Clause was hotly contested during the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, the Senate’s power to amend revenue-raising bills has deprived the Clause of much practical significance.

The Presentment Clause is no such paper tiger. The Clause provides that a bill can become a law only if, after passage by both Houses of Congress, it is presented to the President. The President then has ten days either to sign the bill into law or reject the bill and return it to Congress with an explanation of his or her objections.

If the President rejects the bill, he or she must return it to the House in which it originated. This process is known as a “veto,” though the word does not actually appear in the text of the Constitution. Congress may then modify the bill, responding to the President’s stated objections, to increase the likelihood of presidential approval. Alternatively, Congress may override the President’s veto if both Houses can pass the bill by at least a two-thirds vote. The bill then becomes law without further “presentment” to the President.

Matters are more complicated if the President does nothing by the end of the ten-day window. If Congress is in session, the bill becomes a law—a phenomenon known as “default enactment.” If Congress is out of session, however, the President has no place to return a bill that he or she wishes to veto. In those circumstances, the President may effectively veto the bill by taking no action. This process, first used by James Madison during an intersession recess in 1812, is known as a “pocket veto.” Congress may not override a pocket veto.

What exactly constitutes an adjournment for the purposes of a pocket veto has been a source of conflict. Does any adjournment count, for example, or just those adjournments that end the legislative session? The Supreme Court provided some insight in the Pocket Veto Case (1929), holding that “the determinative question” is whether Congress has adjourned in a manner “that ‘prevents’ the President from returning the bill to the House in which it originated within the time allowed.” Because both Houses had adjourned in the Pocket Veto Case, even though the legislation session was not over, a pocket veto was permissible.

The Court refined that interpretation in Wright v. United States (1938), ruling that a three-day adjournment of just one House of Congress does not permit a pocket veto. For brief adjournments of a single House, the Court ruled, the originating House may designate an agent, such as a Secretary or Clerk, to receive a vetoed bill. Modern practice is more fluid than Wright may suggest, however. Several recent Presidents have purported to pocket veto bills even when the originating House of Congress has designated an agent to receive a veto message.

The third and final Clause, known as the Presentment of Resolutions Clause, concerns the presentment of orders, resolutions, and any issues other than bills. The Presentment of Resolutions Clause was appended at the behest of James Madison, who foresaw the possibility that Congress might circumvent the presentment process by fashioning a bill as a “resolution” or “order.” To avoid that circumvention, the Clause says that any issue requiring the concurrence of the House and the Senate—whatever that issue happens to be called—must be presented to the President. A congressional declaration of war, for example, comes in the form of a joint resolution. Although it is not denominated a “bill,” it must be submitted for presidential approval.

Not all issues require presentment, however. The Clause explicitly exempts questions of adjournment and, under Article V, congressionally proposed amendments to the Constitution are sent to state legislatures for approval, not to the President. More generally, resolutions that are not meant to become law are not subject to presentment. Congress may, for example, adopt concurrent resolutions setting budgetary goals without seeking presidential approval. The same holds for resolutions that apply only to the operation of a particular House, such as imposing censure on a House member or expressing “the mood” of the House. By the same token, legislative subpoenas are not presented to the president for his approval.

The Supreme Court reinforced the Presentment of Resolutions Clause (and vindicated Madison’s prediction) most famously in I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983), ruling that it was unconstitutional for Congress to use a resolution to overturn an executive action. The Court reasoned that such a “legislative veto” circumvents the presentment process and infringes on the President’s power to execute the laws.